Tag: philosophy

The posture of the wronged who remain silent is truly beautiful. Faced with a patent injustice, with all the reasons to rebel and fight back, he responds with silence. It seems to us, who observe him, that such an attitude is a moral lesson. This haughty stoicism, this detachment from pride and indifference to the outcome has a certain tacit grandiosity; of which exploitation or not is often the brightness or flaw of many tragedies. In life, such a spirit deserves from us nothing but respect.

There is a curious vacuum that follows cruel, passionate, thoughtless acts, in which man extrapolates the limits of ethics. Conscience seems to emerge questioning reasons, when it is no longer possible to undo what one has done. A vacuum is imposed, usually resulting in regret for the unnecessary excesses. The comparison with the despot who, in a fit of rage, commits an injustice as undue as it is unnecessary, is fitting. Then it is noted that, for some, such a vacuum is instructive; while, for others, it seems to legitimize immorality and foreshadow even worse excesses.

It is always a pleasure to reflect on those moments when expectation crashes at high speed into a concrete wall, completely destroying itself. There are few moments so favorable to a fair reflection, to a sensible examination of reality as those in which the present is disappointing and the future discouraging. Perhaps this is why pessimism is, in philosophy, the most consistent posture: because when it is based on such strong and obvious experiences, it is almost irrefutable. Moments like these have the power to impose, all at once, humility and silence.

Envy is invincible. Perhaps, among all human feelings, only envy has this absolutely inflexible character. We could observe it from two points of view: that of the one who exercises it, and that of the one who suffers it. The envious person is a slave to this feeling which, if not stimulated, arises and strengthens spontaneously. Even if he wants to overcome it, he cannot do so without disfiguring himself; therefore, the most he can do is to engage in a continuous combat, and continue despite of defeats. As for the envied, that is, the patient of envy, what can he do? This one, no doubt, finds himself even more powerless in the face of the problem, and it seems that no action he may take will be able to annul it. He may resort to contempt, which is a reasonable solution, and will only deviate from the natural discomfort he is experiencing, but will never defeat the agent. In short: the difference, in both perspectives, seems to be simply reduced to two postures: that of those who incite, and that of those who avoid envy; in both cases, a difference of character only, not of results.