Tag: philosophy

A love disappointment affects, more often than not, a superficial and less noble layer of the individual. It hurts, but it is the physical pain of the wounded animal. Generally, it does not shake the concept of love in the disappointed soul: it is possible to find someone else. Disappointment, however, when it comes from a friend to whom friendship in the only sense in which this word should be used, which elevates the souls involved and ennobles the race, is like a stab wound of very harsh philosophical and moral consequences. Unlike the common love betrayal, it is not pride that is wounded, but the higher part of nature that asked for nothing and received meanness in exchange for generosity. It is something that fills the soul with grief. It destroys the concept one has of others; it weakens the ability to trust; it undermines, in advance, the disposition for future relationships… Such nonsense! As if this word, just like the other, was not already corrupted…

Although they can be related, antipathy to socialization and social inability are completely different things. Introversion does not necessarily imply shyness or inhibition. Many psychologists fall into this error, and those who do not, err in judging the former to be a personality disorder—therefore, something which must be corrected. Psychology ended up sinking because it did not define, from the beginning, the scope of its work. It gave in to the charms of novelty and invaded other terrains—terrains whose complexity is beyond its means of analysis. It proceeded in this way, classifying behavioral patterns as if they were always the result of a stupid formula, as if the man had no capacity to judge and choose. Worse than that: without noticing, it established a supposedly universal scale of values to be used as a reference for what is or is not normal. Thus, it erected a human model devoid of individuality—a model, therefore, extremely superficial.

However plausible, rational, and, above all, seductive these new philosophies of “indulgence” which have sprung up in the last century may seem, regrettably they know little about the inner nature of desire. While there is some basis for criticism of the methods employed by religions to condemn human nature and to inoculate souls with an often unwarranted sense of guilt, and while, no doubt, violent repression of impulses may produce moral monsters, the path of “indulgence” in no way leads to the results these philosophies promise. They err because they think that indulgence will deliver satisfaction to souls, but this, by the means proposed, is very, very fleeting. Indulgence does not make the indulgent master of desires, any more than desires are overcome by repression. Perennial satisfaction comes from a peaceful elevation over the flesh, a turning entirely to something higher, which is nothing other than the adoption of a scale of values different from that of ordinary men. But there it is: for the new philosophers of indulgence, adopting such a scale is unthinkable. What they will never understand is that not every man suffers from desire, because there are those who make its manifestations simply insignificant.